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ABSTRACT 
Religious education has remained largely absent from school and 
university curricula in India though its significance has been underlined 
by a plethora of government committees on education. Its absence can 
be traced to the imperatives of rule, both in the colonial period, and 
in post Independent India, and the need to balance competing claims 
and pressures. This paper shows how, on the one hand, the policy of 
religious neutrality – and later avowed secularism – and on the other, a 
desire for inculcation of moral, “spiritual” and “Indian” values tended to 
favour a natural religion approach. This idea of natural religion though 
comes to be inflected with a majoritarian bias. 
KEYWORDS 
Macaulay, religious neutrality, missionaries, spiritual values, natural 
religion
Introduction
In this paper, I attempt to chart out a tentative history of religious education 
in India focusing broadly on debates and policies on religious instruction in 
schools. There are two reasons for this: firstly, I realise that a large number of 
panellists and participants at this conference were engaged with either teaching, 
or studying religious education (henceforth RE) in schools, whether its curricula 
or pedagogy; and secondly, how the universities understood or incorporated – 
or even expelled – RE in India could not be disentangled from the policies 
affecting RE in schools. Indeed, it is difficult to distinguish the two, and difficult 
to understand the experience of RE in Indian universities without the broader 
background. This broader background consists of many questions about the 
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nature, content and purpose of education. These were questions being framed and 
thrashed out first in the context of colonial rule, and then in terms of the vision of a 
newly independent postcolonial state. Central to this was the distinctive trajectory 
that secularism took in India. The experience of Partition and the bloody communal 
violence that accompanied it, also informed it. RE is expressly absent from Indian 
school and university curricula. Why was this so?
Religious Education in the Colonial Period 
The early years of colonial rule in India – especially till 1830s – were marked by the 
dominance of Orientalists, with a decided interest in Eastern religions and their sacred 
texts. The British established their own madrasa Aliyah in Calcutta in 1792 (which has 
recently been converted into a university) and a Sanskrit College in Benaras in 1780. 
These were two of the three educational institutions endowed out of Indian revenues 
(Lelyveld, 1984, p. 86; Chatterjee, 2011, p. 26). The encouragement to Sanskrit and 
Arabic was premised partly on the principle that the sacred books of Hindus and 
Muslims were the sources of law by which the British would govern the subjects. 
However in 1835, the notorious Minute of Macaulay – Lord Thomas Babington 
Macaulay, son of a missionary, and Law member of Governor General’s Council – 
reflected the increasing impatience with the East India Company’s policy of Orientalism. 
In advocating a choking of patronage to the study of Oriental languages and literatures 
of “Hindus and Mohammadens”, Macaulay conjoined both the Utilitarian critique led 
by James Mills that these studies served no purpose, and the Anglicist demand for a 
more vigorous Christian policy in the colony. Macaulay’s grounds for putting an end to 
this were manifold: the uselessness of learning these languages which did not prepare 
the pupils for a career, or even a bare sustenance; the drag on Company funds in 
publishing Arabic and Sanskrit books (which he called “waste paper” reflecting his 
prejudice against Eastern learning); the near completion of the project of codification 
of law which would render unnecessary the aid of pandits (Brahmin scholars) and 
maulvis (learned doctors or teachers of Islamic law) to interpret the Hindu sacred texts 
Shastras and Hedayas; and of course the falsity of these religions.
The following paragraph from the Minute brings to us in essence what appeared 
to Macaulay to be innately wrong with the encouragement of “Hindu and Muslim 
languages”: 
It is said that the Sanscrit and the Arabic are the languages in which the sacred 
books of a hundred millions of people are written, and that they are on that 
account entitled to peculiar encouragement. Assuredly it is the duty of the British 
Government in India to be not only tolerant but neutral on all religious questions. 
But to encourage the study of a literature, admitted to be of small intrinsic value, 
only because that literature inculcated the most serious errors on the most 
important subjects, is a course hardly reconcilable with reason, with morality, 
or even with that very neutrality which ought, as we all agree, to be sacredly 
preserved. It is confined that a language is barren of useful knowledge. We are 
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to teach it because it is fruitful of monstrous superstitions. We are to teach false 
history, false astronomy, false medicine, because we find them in company with 
a false religion. (Macaulay, 1835)
The emphasis on English literature, Western philosophy and sciences and its validation 
as the most valuable knowledge perforce placed Christian mission-run schools in an 
advantageous position. However, the English were at the same time wary of identifying 
their government too closely with Christianity. Thus, we see that Macaulay advised 
abstention from encouraging “those who are engaged in the work of converting the 
natives to Christianity” (Macaulay, 1835). Following him, the Despatch of 1854 authored 
by Wood, provided the Company’s blue print of education of natives, and established 
the grant in aid system. It underlined that “good and secular education” would be the 
criteria for providing aid to schools and not instruction in Bible. The policy of religious 
neutrality was laid out in the following terms: the masters of government schools were 
not precluded from giving instruction out of school hours in the facts and doctrines 
of the Christian religion to any pupils who might apply for such instruction; and in the 
aided schools, the government would abstain from religious instruction conveyed in the 
schools, and the inspectors were to take no notice whatsoever of the religious doctrines 
which may be taught in schools (Wood’s Despatch, 1854, par. 54). 
Though Macaulay insisted that Sanskrit and Arabic could not claim British support 
either as “the languages of law” or as “the languages of religion”, the consequence of this 
was not simply an efflorescence of missionary educational initiatives. In many regions 
such as the Punjab, support for what has been called vernacular Orientalism continued. 
Elsewhere, as in Madras, the grant support for mission schools and institutions was 
uneven. In fact, a complaint about the government’s parsimony in this regard elicited a 
50-page long letter from the Director of Public Instruction recounting the natives’ fears 
about the proselytisation in mission school and the importance of state neutrality in 
matters of religion. Col. Macdonald also cited a meeting of over 6–7 thousand Hindus 
and Muslims in Madras in April 1859 who had appealed to the government to stop aid 
to mission schools and sought protection from religious instruction. The Missions on 
the other hand interpreted the 1854 Despatch to have provided for “the establishment 
of local boards of education and board schools financed from local property rates…, 
purely secular teaching, and grants-in-aid to voluntary societies whether they be 
Christian, Moslem or Hindu” (Whitehead, 2004, p. 126). 
The debates reached a head by the time the Indian Education Commission 
was instituted in 1882 to review the progress in the field of education since Wood’s 
Despatch of 1854. The question of religious instruction was an issue that exercised 
many witnesses who deposed before the Commission. A proposal was placed before 
the Commission that arrangements for religious instruction be permitted provided 
that a) parents may be enabled to withdraw children from it if they so wished; b) that 
the inspector and other departmental officer not interfere or examine such subjects; 
and c) that if there be sufficient numbers of dissenters, separate classes should be 
established for them. The majority in the Commission rejected this proposal because 
“religious feeling was so inflammable, and sectarianism so prevalent in India, that it 
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was not safe to depart from the earlier policy” despite the admission of the value of RE 
on all sides (Indian Education Commission, 1883, p. 129; emphasis added). 
But two innovations from earlier policy were made. In the field of primary 
education, the Commission felt a real threat of retardation of the spread of education 
because parents loathed to send their wards to schools where religious instruction 
was compulsory. Such an exigency necessitated a departure from the policy of 
absolute abstention from interfering in a school’s programme of religious instruction. 
Thus, a recommendation was made that: “it shall be open to parents to withdraw their 
children from attendance of such instruction without forfeiting any of the benefits of the 
institution” (Indian Education Commission, 1883, p. 512). 
The second innovation was the recommendation to introduce moral education at 
the college level. But ever mindful of the difficulties of producing a curriculum which 
might be acceptable to all sides, the Commission urged for the preparation of a “moral 
textbook based upon the fundamental principles of natural religion” (Indian Education 
Commission, 1883, p. 307). This, as we shall see, was to become the model later too. 
Three caveats were added: that there should be no complaints about interference in 
religious beliefs; the candidates should not be called upon to declare religious beliefs; 
and no answer be objected on the grounds of it expressing any peculiarity of religious 
belief (Indian Education Commission, 1883, p. 308). 
In a way, both of these departures could be seen as responses to two divergent 
demands, which played out in the Commission. The first was possibly a concession 
to the demands for a conscience clause by Indian witnesses, namely, Kashinath 
Telang, who wrote a detailed dissent note explicating the same. The missionaries 
and those disposed towards the expansion of missionary education stressed that 
the government policy of neutrality (or of not encouraging mission schools alone) had 
been decidedly “injurious from a moral and religious point of view” (Indian Education 
Commission, 1883, p. 610). The recommendation on moral training in colleges had 
resulted from the pressure of this lobby. Telang, though unsuccessful in his bid for 
something akin to Section 7 of the British Education Act of 1870, insisted that there 
was no way of satisfying the demand for religious instruction. The only tow models, 
he argued, were either the teaching of common principles under the name of Natural 
Religion, or instruction in the principles of all creeds, but the practical difficulties in 
pursuing either of these paths offered secular education as the only “remote haven of 
refuge for the educationists” (Indian Education Commission, 1883, p. 610). Telang’s 
dissent suggests that the Indian national opinion – or at least a part of it – was on the 
side of complete severing of any religious training or teaching from secular education. 
The dilemma that RE presented to policy makers was this: recognition of the 
value of religious instruction as a force of morality and virtue; the demands of missions 
to be given preferential treatment, native fears about widespread proselytisation, the 
governmental expediency of maintaining communal peace, alongside the aim of 
massification of primary education. The compromise that resulted from these opposing 
pulls and pushes was the expulsion of RE from government prescribed curricula, and 
a sort of laissez-faire to private initiatives of various hues as long as they maintained a 
certain standard of secular education. 
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Towards Independence
As the Government of India Act 1919, and then of 1935 paved the way for greater 
autonomy formation of provincial governments led by Indians, especially the Congress. 
With the introduction of diarchy which transferred the education departments to 
Indian ministers, a more nationalist vision of education was put forth. In 1937, Gandhi 
convened a committee of educationists headed by the then principal of Jamia Millia 
Islamia, Dr. Zakir Hussain, to prepare a future primary education scheme. Called 
the Wardha Scheme, it advocated a free, compulsory and universal education for all 
children. A progressive document, it was adopted by the Congress in its session in 
1938 as a resolution on National Education, and its provincial governments began to 
implement it (with little success though) (Oesterheld, 2007, p. 4).
RE remained an unresolved issue in the Wardha scheme. Of all the national 
leaders, Gandhi’s politics has been spoken of as having a spiritual basis. In 1928, 
writing in Young India, he had said:
A curriculum of religious instruction should include a study of the tenets of faiths 
other than one’s own. For this purpose the students should be trained to cultivate 
the habit of understanding and appreciating the doctrines of various great religions 
of the world in a spirit of reverence and broad-minded tolerance. This if properly 
done would help to give them a spiritual assurance and a better appreciation of 
their own religion. There is one rule, however, which should always be kept in 
mind while studying all great religions, and that is that one should study them only 
through the writings of known votaries of the respective religions. (Gandhi, 1928)
Nonetheless, the Wardha scheme made no provision for RE. In fact, Gandhi justified 
the exclusion “because we are afraid that religions, as they are taught and practised 
today, lead to conflict rather than unity” (in: Oesterheld, 2007, p. 7). At a later stage 
too, in 1947, he rebuffed the idea that RE could be a state concern, emphasising that 
it must remain the sole concern of religious associations. He did however underline 
that fundamental ethics being common to all religions, its teaching was “undoubtedly 
a function of the State” (Sethi, 2010, p. 10).
Meanwhile two parallel processes were at play. The first was the appointment 
by the government Central Advisory Board of Education (CABE) of a committee to 
examine the Wardha scheme in 1938, and a separate committee in 1946 devoted 
exclusively to study the possibility of RE. While no consensus emerged in the first 
committee, the second CABE committee of 1946, in its Interim Report, recommended 
“as in Britain, an agreed syllabus, expert teachers, the use of prime hours of instruction 
and the provision for a conscience clause” (Chatterjee, 2011, p. 197). Its final report, 
however, deemed RE to be the responsibility of the homes and the religious community 
to which the pupil belonged – a result, which a disappointed Sargent contemptuously 
called “a small mouse” (Sargent Report, 1948, pp. 12, 226). The second process 
focussed on what was happening in the provinces. Many of the ministers in charge 
of provincial educational ministries, though avowed Congressmen, were cultural 
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conservatives, or positively majoritarian, subscribing to a Hindi/Hindu/Hindustan 
model. This deemed India to be a land of Hindus, who spoke a chaste and heavily 
Sanskritised Hindi shorn of all Persian influences. An illustration of this hegemonic 
model was the Vidya Mandir scheme [quite literally translated as Temples of learning] 
introduced by the Central Provinces, which was seen widely as a crusade to efface 
Islamic culture and religious heritage (Oesterheld, 2007, p. 10).
Legislative Debates
The question of RE came up once again when the Constitution was being drafted 
(29 Aug 1947 – 26 Nov 1949). Article 28(1) of the Constitution, expressly forbids the 
provision of religious instruction in any educational institution wholly maintained out of 
state funds. At the same time, however, different articles, namely, 28(2), 29 and 30(1), 
allow the setting up and functioning of schools and institutions of higher education by 
religious minorities, and even the receipt of grant in aid from the government, as long 
as these do not discriminate on the basis of religion in admissions. It is interesting to 
trace the route through which the drafters arrived at these articles. 
Article 28 was originally clause 16 of the Report of the Advisory Committee on 
Fundamental Rights, which was placed before the Constituent Assembly in August 
1947. It read: 
No person attending any school maintained or receiving aid out of public funds 
shall be compelled to take part in any religious instruction that may be given 
in the school or to attend religious workshop held in the school or in premises 
attached thereto. 
Clearly, in its original form, it did not envision expelling religion from schools, whether 
aided or government, only that no one would be compelled to participate in such 
instructions. There were two sorts of objections to this. The first amendment moved 
by Purnima Banerjee rued that there were a large number of educational institutions 
run on religious lines (maktabs and pathshalas, corresponding to Islamic and Hindu 
institutions respectively) who impart to students “fanaticism and religious bigotry”, 
which could only be allayed a governmental control of the curriculum. A state which 
hoped to stay united (remember the background of Partition) – no matter how secular – 
required that its children must learn to appreciate the religion of another. Only a syllabus 
of such a type may be the bulwark against exclusivism (Constituent Assembly Debates 
(CAD), 5.67). She therefore proposed the addition of this paragraph as explanation, 
“[a]ll religious education given in educational institutions receiving Statewide will be 
in the nature of the elementary philosophy of comparative religions calculated to 
broaden the pupils’ mind rather than such as will foster sectarian exclusiveness” (CAD, 
5.46.66). Renuka Ray, on the other hand, sought to bring unequivocal exclusion of 
RE with her amendment, “[n]o denominational religious instruction shall be provided 
in schools maintained by the State. No person attending any school or educational 
institution recognised or aided by the State shall be compelled to attend any such 
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religious instruction” (CAD, 5.46.70). Ray’s proposal received a greater reception 
and approval from the members whilst Purnima Banerjee’s proposal was deemed 
controversial. 
What would be the contours of such a comparative religion – questions raised by 
members Mahboob Ali Baig Sahib Bahadur – and what would it mean for rights being 
promised to the minorities to run their educational institutions, and further, what would 
be the implications of the proposed “unification of all religions” for the constitutional 
rights of minorities were all questions that were raised (CAD, 5.46.77-80). Another 
member, K. M. Munshi, also warned that disputes over the precise content and nature 
of elementary philosophy of comparative religions would lead to litigation, with the 
courts expected to pronounce whether the syllabus was of comparative kind, or 
belonged to one specific religion; and further, if such a syllabus would broaden or 
narrow the outlook of students. Therefore, Munshi cautioned that the adoption of 
comparative religions as a dictum could never become justiciable, but would only lead 
to considerable confusion and legal imbroglio (CAD, 5.46.83,86-87). 
The second amendment, though more popular, was referred to a subcommittee 
which would report to the drafting committee. When the article suitably amended 
finally appeared for discussion in the Constituent Assembly, there were several 
amendments of different shades. On the one hand were those like Shiban Lal Saksena 
who resented the exclusion of religion on account of protection afforded to minorities. 
While minorities should not be compelled to have religious instruction against their 
wishes, the District education boards should not be barred from teaching the children 
of the majority community Gita and Ramayana, he felt. On the other hand were 
members like K. T. Shah who thought the provisions against teaching of religion to 
be too loosely worded and sought them to be made more stringent. B. R. Ambedkar’s 
response to these was threefold: First that the monies generated from general taxation 
could not be used to provide any particular RE; the second factor militating against the 
provision of RE was the preponderance of religions and sects in India, and finally, he 
reminded the house that “unfortunately the religions which prevail in this country are 
not merely non-social; so far as their mutual relations are concerned, they are anti-
social”. Thus, he concluded that in “laying down in article 22(1) that in State institutions 
there shall be no religious instruction, we have in my judgment travelled the path of 
complete safety” (CAD, 7.68.159-163). [I am not going here into the discussions about 
aided schools run by religious communities covered under 28(2) now]. In the course 
of the discussion, Ambedkar distinguished between religious instruction and study of 
religions, and stressed that it was only the former, which was prohibited. 
Nonetheless, the issue of RE refused to disappear. Immediately after the 
CAD took place, a committee to look into university education was appointed. 
Headed by S. Radhakrishnan, Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics 
at the University of Oxford, it devoted considerable time on discussing RE. The 
Radhakrishnan Commission set out the agenda of RE in the following poetic terms: 
We teach religious dogmas not to provoke doubts of questions but to give comfort 
to the human spirit. To introduce these studies in a University is to make a sharp 
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break with the critical methods of inquiry followed in other disciplines of the 
curriculum. To prescribe dogmatic religions in a community of many different 
faiths is to revive the religious controversies of the past. To turn the students over 
to theologians of different denominations for instruction in the conflicting systems 
of salvation is to undermine that fellowship of learning which defines a college or 
a university. (p. 256)
And yet, to “exclude spiritual training” would be being “untrue to our whole historical 
development” and to negate “the beauty and mystery of the universe, the meaning of 
life and death, the aspirations of the inner soul, that sad feeling of the wistful minded 
that beyond the world of positive knowledge there is a realm of forces unseen which we 
can feel but never know completely (Radhakrishnan Commission, 1963, pp. 260–261). 
It thus recommended that:
(1) all educational institutions start work with a few minutes for silent meditation;
(2) in the first year of the Degree course lives of the great religious leaders like
Gautama the Buddha, Confucius, Zoroaster, Socrates, Jesus, Somkara, 
Ramanuja, Madhava, Mohammad, Kabir, Nanak, Gandhi, be taught;
(3) in the second year some selections of a universalist, character from the 
Scriptures of the world be studied;
(4) in the third year, the central problems of the philosophy of religion be 
considered. (Radhakrishnan Commission, 1963, p. 265) 
 
The issue of religious instruction in schools was first dealt with in detail in the Report 
of the Committee on Religious and Moral Instruction (also known as the Sri Prakasa 
Committee) submitted to the Ministry of Education as early as in 1960. It advocated 
an “objective, comparative and sympathetic study of all the important religions of India” 
(extracted in Biswas and Agrawal, 1986, p. 612). The imperative of the Sri Prakasa 
Committee in making such a recommendation – as indeed of the other Committees and 
their recommendations such as the Kothari Commission in 1966 – was the task of “nation-
building” and the forging of a “national consciousness”. The task of RE could not be left to 
the home and community alone, the Sri Prakasa Committee argued, as this would result 
in limited understanding of one’s own faith, ignorance of other faiths and blind prejudice 
towards others. Report of the Kothari Commission (1966), mulling over the nature of 
education that a secular state in a multi-religious democracy may impart, distinguished 
between “religious education” and “education about religions”. It lamented that: 
...owing to the ban placed on religious instruction in schools and the weakening of 
the home influences which, in the past, often provided such instruction, children 
are now growing up without any clear idea of their own religion and with no 
chance of learning about others”. It thus recommended that a “period or two a 
week should be allotted to education in moral and spiritual values in an organized 
attempt to develop the character of the pupils and inculcate in them a respect for 
religions other than their own”. (cited in Ayyar, 2017, pp. 299–300) 
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None of these recommendations were followed. The 81st Report on Value Based 
Education (also called the SB Chavan Committee) submitted its report to the 
Parliament in 1999. “Values” was the locus of the SB Chavan Committee report. Value 
education was of supremely civic importance, as it would foster national integration 
and make students aware that the basic concept behind every religion is common. It 
would repel the overwhelming influence of western culture. But what precisely would 
these values be: they were indigenous and national values but seen deriving from 
“ultimate reality supreme power or self-consciousness to which man orients himself” 
(The 81st Report on Value Based Education, 1999). Ancient gurukuls (traditional Hindu 
educational institutions) were invoked as models of a value based educational system. 
The Idea of Religion
Perhaps because the multiplicity of religions and creeds in the country, and the 
pragmatic need to keep peace, most policymakers gravitated towards the idea of a 
universal or natural religion. If committees instituted by colonial government identified 
ethics and morals derived from the common core of religions as the subject worthy of 
study (though never enforced), we see Purnima Banerjee’s proposal not very different. 
The Radhakrishnan Commission spoke of an “Indian” outlook on religions, which in 
their view was not inconsistent with Constitutional principles. It held that religion is 
neither creed, nor emotion nor a ceremony, but a realisation which can be apprehended 
not by beliefs but “by their fruits”. And if religion was a matter of realisation, then its 
vehicles were to be training, discipline and sadhna (spiritual practices).
This received its most cogent form in a judicial pronouncement in 2002. In 2000, 
the right-wing BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party or Indian Peoples’ Party) government had 
proposed a New Curriculum Framework (NCF) which sought to give prominent place 
to RE. Again, the terminology was not new – students were to be made aware that 
the essence of all religions was common. It also proposed a new “spiritual quotient” 
and placed a premium on the learning of Sanskrit. A group of civil society activists 
approached the Supreme Court expressing the apprehension that the NCF would 
pave the way for “saffronisation of education” (a term commonly used by secular 
and left academics and activists to denote exclusivist communalisation), and that 
it fundamentally militated against the settled principle inhering in Article 28 (Shah, 
2002). The Supreme Court dismissed the petition holding that NCF did not violate the 
principle of secularism (Shah, 2002; all citations below from it).
What interests me most here is also the definition of religion that emerges from 
this judgment. Justice Shah approvingly quoted a judgment ([1960] 9 SCC 548), to 
demonstrate a distinction between religion and dharma, “143. Our dharma is said to 
be ‘Sanatana’ i.e. one which has eternal values; one which is neither time-bound nor 
space-bound. It is because of this that Rig Veda has referred to the existence ‘Sanatan 
Dharmani’. ‘It is crystal clear’, he concluded, ‘that the word’ ‘religion’ has different shades 
and colours. Important shade is dharma (duty). That is to say, duty towards the society 
and the soul”. Here again we find the belief that there is an Indian sense of religion, which 
is compatible with secularism. 
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His brother judge, J. Dharmadhikari, insists on distinguishing religious instruction 
from RE. It is the former, which is prohibited in a secular state – the latter that should 
introduce pupils to religious philosophies without indoctrinating them, or curbing 
their independent thinking is to be encouraged. It is an experiment which needs 
caution and vigil. Though he leaves it to the educationists to frame such a curriculum, 
its contours are not entirely absent in his judgment. RE would be the “teaching of 
philosophies of religions with more emphasis on study of essential moral and spiritual 
thoughts contained in various religions” and would have no place for the “teaching of 
rituals, observances, customs and traditions and other non-essential observances or 
modes of worship” (emphasis added). The identification of morality, philosophy and 
nebulous spirituality as essential cores of religion and observances as non-essential 
or peripheral; or the primacy of doctrine over practice, has been a dominant mode of 
judicial thinking on religion, and we see it being repeated here.
The imprint of Phenomenology of Religions in his fervent hope that RE be 
premised on Religious Pluralism is obvious. In this conception of religious pluralism, 
world religions are viewed as embodying “different perceptions and conceptions of 
and correspondingly different responses to, the Real or Ultimate”. Nonetheless as 
for J. Shah, for him too, the English word “religion” is inadequate in fully conveying 
“the Indian concept of religion”, which is dharma. He writes: “Hindus believe in Vedas. 
The word ‘Dharma’ has a very wide meaning.” Note how quickly the Indian concept of 
religion elides into a Hindu, Vedic one, and how sanatan dharma comes to stand in for 
natural religion: “Dharma or righteousness is elemental and fundamental in all nations, 
periods and times. For example truth, love, compassion are human virtues. This is 
what Hindu call Sanatan Dharma meaning religion which is immutable, constant, 
living permanent and ever in existence”.
Conclusion
Thus, the model of RE in post Independent India remained this: the official banishment 
of RE from the curriculum; lack of any discussion among educationists on what 
might constitute a proper RE curriculum, and deriving from it a moral frame tending 
towards Natural Religion; and finally, despite the exclusion of RE, the cementing and 
naturalisation of a majoritarian idea of religion, culture and Indian-ness. 
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